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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 19-cv-2184-TJK

Plaintiff
v.
FACEBOOK, Inc.,
a corporation,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER’S MOTION TO INTERVENE
Plaintiff, the United States of America, respectfully files this response to the
motion to intervene or for leave to file an amicus curiae brief (Dkt. 5) filed by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”), Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 5
(hereinafter “EPIC Motion”). The Court should deny the motion to intervene because
EPIC lacks Article III standing and does not satisfy the elements for either intervention as
of right or permissive intervention. The United States takes no position on EPIC’s
alternative request for leave to file an amicus curiae brief, but it urges an expedited
briefing schedule and does not believe a hearing is necessary if leave is granted.
INTRODUCTION
On July 24, 2019, the United States, upon referral from the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), filed the Complaint (ECF No. 1) against Facebook, Inc., which
includes five counts alleging that Facebook violated a 2012 FTC administrative order and
one count alleging that Facebook violated the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The
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Complaint seeks civil penalties and injunctive relief. The United States immediately
thereafter filed a Consent Motion for Entry of a Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty,
Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 4), asking the Court to settle the
case by issuing the Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and
Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 4-1) (hereinafter “Stipulated Order”).
The Stipulated Order represents a historic data-privacy settlement arising out of a
major FTC investigation into allegations that Facebook engaged in deceptive conduct that
violated the 2012 Order and the FTC Act, as well as months of intensive negotiations.
The $5 billion civil penalty is more than 20 times larger than the largest privacy-related
penalty assessed anywhere in the world, is the second largest civil penalty ever assessed
in the history of the republic, and represents almost a quarter of Facebook’s 2018 profits.1
The sweeping injunctive relief is also unprecedented. Under the proposed FTC
administrative order attached to the Stipulated Order, ECF No. 4-1 at 9 (hereinafter “FTC
order”), Facebook will have to amend its corporate charter to create two new independent
committees on its Board of Directors, including one committee whose sole focus will be
privacy oversight and compliance with the FTC order. Facebook will have to implement
a privacy program that assesses all aspects of its operations for privacy risks, implements
safeguards that control for those risks, reviews all new or modified products or services
before implementation for privacy risks, and documents its privacy decisions in a manner

1

EPIC, along with other privacy advocacy groups, publicly urged the FTC to obtain a $2
or $2.2 billion judgment—less than half of what the government ultimately obtained.
See https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/2011-consent-order/US-NGOs-to-FTC-re-FB-Jan2019.pdf.
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that will provide unprecedented transparency and scrutiny into Facebook’s privacy
practices.
The FTC order also strengthens external oversight of Facebook, and requires
Facebook’s compliance officials and CEO to certify regularly that Facebook’s privacy
program complies with the FTC order—subjecting those officials to potential civil and
criminal penalties for making false statements.2
EPIC now seeks to intervene to place itself in the government’s shoes because it
wishes the Stipulated Order were different. It is well-settled law, however, that
government settlements of enforcement actions are accorded deference and may not be
disrupted merely because a third party dislikes the settlement terms. Because EPIC’s
motion to intervene is legally and procedurally infirm, and would serve only to delay
implementation of important protections for American consumers, this Court should deny
it. Moreover, should the Court grant EPIC leave to file an amicus brief, the Court need
not delay entry of the Stipulated Order with a prolonged briefing schedule or hearing.
ARGUMENT
EPIC’s intervention is improper under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or 24(b).
EPIC cannot satisfy Rule 24(a)’s threshold requirements to intervene as of right because
it does not have Article III standing and cannot meet Rule 24(a)’s other requirements.
EPIC also cannot satisfy the factors for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), and

2

The FTC order also requires, among other things, new obligations requiring: heightened
oversight of third-party developers; affirmative express consent for any new uses of
facial-recognition technology that materially exceed prior disclosures; prohibitions on
using phone numbers obtained for security purposes for advertising; a comprehensive
data-security program; and specific data-security obligations related to authentication,
encryption, and access controls.
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granting such intervention would harm the public by delaying implementation of the
Stipulated Order’s important consumer protections. In addition, while the United States
takes no position on EPIC’s request to file an amicus brief, there is no need to hold a
hearing on the parties’ motion to enter the Stipulated Order.
I. EPIC Cannot Satisfy the Rule 24(a) Requirements to Intervene as of Right
A person seeking to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) must prove
that it has Article III standing and then demonstrate four additional requirements:
“(1) that the application to intervene is timely; (2) the party has a legally protected
interest in the action; (3) the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4) no party to
the action can adequately represent that interest.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC,
717 F.3d 189, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. FDA, 323 F.R.D. 54,
59 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases). Here, EPIC does not have Article III standing and
cannot satisfy the Rule 24(a) factors.
A. EPIC Lacks Article III Standing
As a threshold matter, EPIC lacks Article III standing to intervene. The three
elements necessary to establish Article III standing are (1) actual or threatened injury-infact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.
___, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). EPIC cannot meet these elements.
1. EPIC Has No Injury-in-Fact
To show injury-in-fact, the proposed intervenor must show the “invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
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(1992). If standing is premised on future injury, the party “must demonstrate a realistic
danger of sustaining a direct injury.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Moreover, as it must establish organizational standing,3 EPIC also must show that the
resolution of this case will “perceptibly impair[]” its ability to provide services or will
inhibit its daily operations. Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
EPIC incorrectly asserts that it will suffer an injury-in-fact from the proposed
settlement because the settlement will resolve complaints EPIC submitted to the FTC
about Facebook, presumably on terms that EPIC dislikes. EPIC Motion at 1, 11; EPIC
Motion Exhibits 2-3, 6-11. Such a concern is precisely the type of abstract interest that
falls far short of establishing standing. See, e.g., EPIC v. FAA, 892 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (dismissing EPIC’s petition for review of FAA drone regulations for lack of
standing because, among other reasons, “[i]mpediments to ‘pure issue-advocacy’ cannot
establish standing”).
First, as made clear by the regulation under which EPIC submitted its complaints
to the FTC, EPIC’s submissions do not give EPIC a legally protected interest in the
FTC’s enforcement decisions. See EPIC Motion at 11. Specifically, 16 C.F.R. § 2.2

3

EPIC does not identify whether it believes it has organizational or associational
standing, but, because the elements of associational standing do not exist here and EPIC
does not assert any of them, EPIC’s motion is presumably based on organizational
standing. Associational standing exists where the organization seeks to intervene on
behalf of its members, at least one of which must have standing in its own right. Cigar
Ass’n, 323 F.R.D. at 64 (organization must also show that the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to its purposes and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires an individual member to participate in the lawsuit) (citing NRDC v. EPA, 489
F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977)).
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allows anyone to file any type of concern with the FTC—either via the FTC’s website, a
toll-free telephone number, or a signed statement—and makes clear that “[n]o forms or
formal procedures are required.” 16 C.F.R. § 2.2(a). The regulation also expressly states
that “[t]he person making the complaint or request is not regarded as a party to any
proceeding that might result from the investigation” that the FTC may conduct following
review of the complaint or request. Id. § 2.2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulation’s
explicit language does not afford a complainant any legal interest in the outcome of an
enforcement action that may relate to its complaint. Even in cases involving statutes that
explicitly give the public a right to sue, unlike the FTC Act, courts have held that filing
an administrative complaint does not establish the complainants’ Article III standing to
sue in court. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 799 F. Supp. 2d
78, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
Second, even assuming that EPIC had a legally protected interest in having its
complaints considered by the FTC, the proposed settlement would not invade such an
interest. The FTC carefully considered and evaluated the complaints submitted by EPIC
and others in the course of its investigation and compliance-monitoring work. See
Commissioner Statements, In re Facebook, Inc., (July 24, 2019), at 7-8, n.11, available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536946/092_3184_faceb
ook_majority_statement_7-24-19.pdf. The FTC, in conjunction with the Department of
Justice, then weighed information uncovered by the investigation, along with litigation
risks and the benefits of exercising its “broad and legitimate discretion,” to enforce the
law against Facebook via the proposed settlement. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
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831-32 (1985); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d
434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Thus, contrary to EPIC’s assertions, the proposed settlement
reflects a consideration of its complaints, so that the United States’ discretionary—and
generally not reviewable, see id.—decision to settle is no injury to EPIC.
Third, EPIC does not allege—nor could it—that its organizational activities
would be “perceptibly impaired” or that its “daily operations” would be “inhibited” if it is
not permitted to intervene. Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 919. EPIC does not claim,
for example, that the settlement in this case would inhibit its ability to advocate for
consumers before the FTC, or would force it to incur additional costs to advance its
mission. EPIC’s interest in Facebook-related data-privacy issues and its desire to explain
its generalized views on the settlement to the Court are “abstract concern[s];” they simply
are not a particularized injury sufficient to support Article III standing. Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[f]rustration of an
organization’s objectives ‘is the type of abstract concern that does not impart standing’”)
(quoting Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir.
1995)). EPIC therefore cannot show an injury-in-fact. This alone means it cannot
intervene as of right.4

4

EPIC supports its standing argument by citing Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies
v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Unlike this case, Crossroads specifically
implicated the proposed intervenor. There, the Federal Election Commission ruled in
Crossroads’ favor, and Public Citizen challenged that ruling. The D.C. Circuit allowed
Crossroads to intervene as a defendant, because Crossroads would be directly affected by
the ruling: if the ruling was upheld, Crossroads would benefit legally, while if it were
overturned, Crossroads would be subject to enforcement proceedings. The potential “loss
of beneficial agency action” constituted a concrete injury to Crossroads. Id.
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2. EPIC’s Purported Injury Is Not Redressable
Even had EPIC identified some injury-in-fact, it could not show that such an
injury would be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court. Contending that “[t]he
proposed settlement fails to safeguard the interests of Facebook users,” EPIC Motion
at 1, EPIC presumably wants the Court to reject the proposed settlement in favor of some
other penalty against Facebook that would—in EPIC’s opinion—safeguard Facebook
users’ interests. But it is pure conjecture that rejecting the proposed settlement would
lead to a different or better outcome that would “safeguard the interests of Facebook
users” in the manner EPIC’s prefers. Indeed, rejecting the settlement could yield
multiple other outcomes in litigation or later settlement far worse for consumers. Not
only does EPIC not address these uncertainties, it does not and cannot explain how
rejecting the settlement will actually remedy the concerns it expresses or give it the relief
it desires. This is exactly the type of “speculation” and “conjecture” that does not support
Article III standing. West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“When
conjecture is necessary, redressability is lacking.”).
*

*

*

EPIC exercised its ability to file complaints with the FTC about Facebook’s
conduct, as anyone else could do. The Stipulated Order will have no legal or financial
consequences for EPIC. EPIC is free to continue advocating to the public and the FTC
its opinions about the Facebook settlement and any other issues it wishes to raise. What
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EPIC cannot do is become a party to this case. EPIC lacks standing to intervene, and its
motion for intervention as of right should be denied on that basis.5
B. EPIC Cannot Satisfy Other Rule 24(a) Requirements
Even assuming that EPIC had Article III standing, it has not established Rule
24(a)’s other requirements for intervention.
For one thing, EPIC’s Motion does not adequately set forth an “application to
intervene” under the first element of Rule 24(a), Deutsche Bank, 717 F.3d at 192, because
it fails to comply with Rule 24(c) and Local Civil Rule 7(j) by submitting the required
“pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.” The Court
and parties are thus left to guess exactly what EPIC wants to assert and how it wants to
assert it. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-1232 (CKK), 2003 WL
1191451, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2003) (noting failure to provide Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c)
pleading among reasons for denying intervention).
EPIC’s articulated basis for intervention—its complaints to the FTC about
Facebook—also does not create a legally protected interest as required under Rule 24(a).
See Deutsche Bank, 717 F.3d at 192-93 (describing second and third factors for
intervention as of right as “(2) the party has a legally protected interest in the action;
[and] (3) the action threatens to impair that interest”). As described above, EPIC’s
complaints do not accord it any legal rights under the FTC Act—which EPIC cannot
enforce, see Action on Safety & Health v. FTC, 498 F.2d 757, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FTC
5

EPIC’s lack of Article III standing does not necessarily doom its request for permissive
intervention. See Defs. of Wildlife & Sierra Club v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1327
(D.C. Cir. 2013); but see Deutsche Bank, 717 F.3d at 194 (Silberman, J., concurring)
(stating that a permissive intervenor must establish standing). As discussed below, other
grounds support denying EPIC’s request for permissive intervention.
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Act contains no private right of action)—and the Stipulated Order does not impair any of
its activities or its consumer advocacy before the FTC. The proposed resolution of this
case thus does not implicate any of EPIC’s legally protected interests.
In addition, EPIC cannot meet Rule 24(a)’s fourth element: showing that the
government would not adequately represent the interests of EPIC and its members.
When “a government entity is a party and the case concerns a matter of sovereign interest
. . . the government is presumed adequately to represent the interests of the public.”
Curry v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Johnson,
800 F.3d 448, 450 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185, 187
(8th Cir. 1997) (when “an existing party to the suit is charged with the responsibility of
representing the intervenor’s interests, a presumption of adequate representation arises”)).
Here, as Congress intended, the FTC and the Department of Justice are acting in the
public interest to “protect[] consumers” by enforcing the FTC Act and the FTC’s
administrative orders. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 243 (1972);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (l).
EPIC cannot rebut this presumption. To do so would require a “strong showing of
inadequate representation,” such as by demonstrating that “the interest of the would-be
intervenor cannot be subsumed within the public interest represented by the government
entity.” Curry, 167 F.3d at 423; see also Chiglo, 104 F.3d at 188 (where the “intervenor’s
only interest in the suit is shared in common with the public,” the intervenor must show a
“clear dereliction of duty” on the part of the government agency). No such showing is
made here: to the contrary, the United States brought this case under the FTC Act’s
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statutory mandate to protect consumers, and is proposing a historic settlement with
unprecedented civil penalty and privacy-related injunctive relief.
EPIC contends that the United States does not adequately represent its interests
because, by settling this case, the United States is foregoing separate action based on its
complaints about Facebook. See EPIC Motion at 5. But “[r]epresentation is not
inadequate simply because . . . the applicant and the existing party have different views
on the facts, the applicable law, or the likelihood of success of a particular litigation
strategy.” United States v. City of New York, 198 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1999). EPIC’s
“difference of opinion” about the government’s litigation strategy and terms of settlement
therefore “does not overcome the presumption of adequate representation.” Jenkins v.
Missouri, 78 F.3d 1270, 1275 (8th Cir. 1996).
Indeed, the United States “deserves special consideration and deference as . . . an
adequate representative of the interests of would-be intervenors.” FTC v. First Capital
Consumer Mbrshp. Servs., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 358, 364 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). Because it is
acting on behalf of consumers nationwide—including EPIC and its members—the
presumption that the United States adequately protects EPIC is particularly salient.
Jenkins, 78 F.3d at 1275 (“There is a presumption of adequate representation when the
persons attempting to intervene are members of a class already involved in the litigation
or are intervening only to protect the interests of class members.”); see also Johnson, 800
F.3d at 452 (holding that interests of consumers seeking intervention were “subsumed
within the public interest because the FTC, on behalf of consumers, seeks relief for the
same deceptive and unconscionable business practices alleged by the consumers,” and
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hence consumers failed to make “necessary strong showing of inadequate
representation”). EPIC’s Rule 24(a) motion accordingly must fail.
II. The Court Should Deny EPIC Permissive Intervention Under Rule 24(b)
EPIC fares no better with permissive intervention than it does with intervention as
of right, and this Court should exercise its discretion to deny EPIC’s motion for
permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). In considering a motion for permissive
intervention where, as here, a federal statute does not confer a conditional right to
intervene, this Court considers whether the proposed intervenor “(1) has an independent
ground for subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) has made a timely motion, and (3) has a claim
or defense that has a question of law or fact in common with the main action.” Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 519 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (D.D.C.
2007).
Although guided by these factors, permissive intervention is at base an
“inherently discretionary enterprise,” and this Court may deny the motion even if the
movant has an independent jurisdictional basis to bring its own suit. EEOC v. Nat’l
Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The Court’s exercise of
discretion under Rule 24(b) also requires it to consider “whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(3).
Here, EPIC incorrectly argues that it has an independent ground for subject matter
jurisdiction—the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331—and that its claims have a
common question of law or fact with this case. EPIC Motion at 17. Because there is no
private right of action under the FTC Act, however, EPIC could not invoke 28 U.S.C.
Page 12 of 17
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§ 1331 federal question jurisdiction to bring a case under the FTC Act. See Action on
Safety & Health, 498 F.2d at 765; Hardaway v. Syneron, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 217, 218
(D.D.C. 2013) (plaintiffs could not invoke the FTC Act to establish federal question
subject matter jurisdiction). Nor does EPIC have any right to enforce the FTC’s 2012
administrative order against Facebook. See SEC v. Prudential Sec., 136 F.3d 153, 158-59
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (collecting cases and holding that only parties to a government consent
decree may seek enforcement of it absent a stipulation otherwise). Thus, any FTC Act
claim that EPIC might try to bring—whether in this or another case—would be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Hardaway, 928 F. Supp.
2d at 218. For similar reasons, EPIC has no “claims” or “defenses” in common with this
case.
EPIC’s participation in this case also is not essential for the “just and equitable
adjudication of the legal question[s] presented.” Sierra Club v. McCarthy, 308 F.R.D. 9,
12 (D.D.C. 2015). The FTC and the Department of Justice have substantial, exclusive
experience and expertise not only in enforcing the FTC’s administrative orders, but also
in litigating and settling such cases to benefit consumers and the public at large.
Furthermore, allowing EPIC to intervene in this case would “unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).
The 200 million-plus members of the American public with Facebook accounts are
waiting for this settlement to be finalized so that Facebook will implement measures to
protect their data. It would be inefficient and highly disruptive to allow any interested
private party to intervene and hijack this matter merely because it disagrees with the
result. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 70 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The
Page 13 of 17
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policy of favoring consent decrees “has particular force where … a government actor
committed to the protection of the public interest has pulled the laboring oar in
constructing the proposed settlement”). Indeed, EPIC’s request for a separate briefing
and hearing schedule to air its ideas signals the disruption that will ensue should this
Court permit EPIC to become a party and attempt to commandeer this case to pursue its
own organizational agenda. The United States asks that the Court deny EPIC’s motion
for permissive intervention.
III. If the Court Grants EPIC Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, the Filing
Should Be As Soon As Possible
The United States takes no position on EPIC’s alternative request to share its
views in an amicus brief, but it respectfully asks that any brief allowed be required as
soon as possible. This request is grounded in a concern that a lengthy briefing schedule
will delay the relief sought for consumers in the proposed settlement.
On the merits of EPIC’s amicus request, this Court’s impending decision on the
parties’ motion to enter the Stipulated Order is governed by a highly deferential standard
of review. See In re Idaho Conserv. League, 811 F.3d 502, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding
that, in approving a settlement, the Court “need not inquire into the precise legal rights of
the parties nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy”). EPIC’s
motion does not meaningfully confront this standard, so the United States does not know
whether the proposed amicus brief will be helpful or not.6 One topic that EPIC
apparently wants to discuss is the 26,000 complaints against Facebook that EPIC claims
6

EPIC’s filing failed to comply with Local Civil Rules 7(m) and 7(o). EPIC neither
consulted with the parties about their position on its interest in filing an amicus brief, nor
briefed the specific reasons it wishes to appear as an amicus.
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the FTC did not adequately address—but the United States is doubtful that such a
discussion will be particularly relevant.7 See EPIC Motion at 21-22; see also WildEarth
Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 59 (D.D.C. 2019) (denying motion to file amicus
that “does not have ‘unique information or perspective that can help the [Court]’”).
IV. The Court Need Not Hold a Hearing
Regardless of how the Court rules on EPIC’s motion to intervene or to file an
amicus brief, it need not hold a hearing before entering the proposed settlement. United
States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1992) (“It is within
the sound discretion of the trial court to decide whether an evidentiary hearing is
necessary before ruling on a proposed consent decree.”); United States v. Cannons Eng’g
Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming district court decision not to hold
hearing on confirmation of consent decree and stating “[w]e start with the proposition
that motions do not usually culminate in evidentiary hearings”).
The United States need only show that the proposed settlement is “within the
reaches” of the public interest for this Court to approve the settlement. United States v.
W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (the district court’s function in deciding
whether to approve a consent decree “is not to determine whether the resulting array of
rights and liabilities is the one that will best serve society, but only to confirm that the
resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest.” (emphasis in original)).

7

EPIC’s suggestion that these 26,000 individual consumer complaints demonstrate the
“full range of public interest in this matter” and are “directly relevant” to the Court’s
consideration of the proposed Consent Decree, EPIC Motion at 17, is inaccurate. A
review of the complaints suggests that a substantial majority have nothing to do with
Facebook’s privacy practices and instead involve consumer-specific issues such as
consumers having trouble logging into their accounts.
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As discussed above and in the parties’ Consent Motion to enter the Stipulated Order
(ECF No. 4), the proposed settlement here readily clears that low bar. In securing a
massive civil penalty and strong, enforceable data-privacy relief for Facebook users and
users of Facebook-owned companies for the next two decades, the proposed settlement
does more for the public interest than any prior data-privacy settlement in the history of
the United States. Thus, while EPIC’s brief demonstrates that it may have a difference of
opinion about the best way to settle allegations against Facebook, there is no
disagreement—and no hearing is necessary to prove—that the proposed settlement at
least is “within the reaches” of the public interest. See W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 309; see
U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 673 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he scope of a
court’s authority to second-guess an agency’s discretionary and policy-based decision to
settle is at best minimal.”).
EPIC’s request for a hearing also appears improperly borrowed from the classaction context, in which fairness hearings consider the arguments of objecting class
members. That context is inapposite here. See U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 752
F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 2014) (review applied to class action settlements “inapt” in the
context of government consent decree). This case implicates only an executive branch
agency’s discretion about how to enforce the law that Congress assigned it to enforce—
and not the proposed settlement’s effect on private rights. A hearing to consider the
settlement’s effect on private rights and private citizens’ complaints to the FTC is
therefore unnecessary.

Page 16 of 17

Case 1:19-cv-02184-TJK Document 11 Filed 08/05/19 Page 17 of 17

CONCLUSION
The United States opposes EPIC’s motion to intervene under Rules 24(a) or 24(b)
and respectfully requests that the Court deny it, as well as EPIC’s request for a hearing.
The United States takes no position on EPIC’s request to file a brief as amicus curiae, but
asks that, if the Court grants the request, it order such brief to be filed as soon as possible.
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